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II. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION. 
This is an appeal of a final judgment and related order 
entered after trial on the merits by The Honorable William w. 
Barrett for the Third District Court, Division II. The Utah 
Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) and Rule 3(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. Under Utah Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 29(b), the case falls under oral argument priority 15. 
III. DETERMINATIVE STATUTES. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1) is determinative of a 
portion of appellant's appeal. It states: 
(1) To whom awarded. Except when express 
provision therefor is made either in a statute of this 
state or in these rules, costs shall be awarded as of 
course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs; provided, however, where an appeal 
or other proceeding for review is taken, costs of the 
action, other than costs in connection with such appeal 
or other proceeding for review, shall abide the final 
determination of the cause. Costs against the State if 
Utah, its officers and agencies shall be imposed only 
to the extent permitted by law. 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(1). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
This case is to determine the proper lawyer's fees the 
appellant, a lawyer, is to be awarded for a lawsuit in which he 
represented the appellee and recovered $3,250.00 in settlement. 
Appellant claimed he should be awarded either a 100% contingent 
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fee according to an unsigned fee agreement or a $10,000 fee award 
in quantum meruit. Appellee claimed the appellant should be 
awarded a one-third contingent fee plus costs, according to a 
verbal agreement between the parties which appellee memorialized 
in correspondence and which appellee made a condition for 
appellant's acceptance of the settlement offers on appellee's 
behalf. 
The trial court entered judgment according to appellee's 
theory of the case, awarding appellant a one-third contingent fee 
plus costs in the previous lawsuit, plus sanctions previously 
ordered against appellee, denying appellant's application for 
costs in this action. Appellee brought a Rule 59(a) motion to 
amend the judgment based on insufficiency of the evidence and 
error in law. The trial court denied the motion. After 
judgment, on appellee's motion, the trial court ordered appellant 
to pay to appellee the balance of the settlement proceeds less 
the judgment amount (the order). Appellant appeals from the 
judgment and order. 
V. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In December, 1994, appellee sought appellant's advice 
regarding a landlord tenant dispute and a minor assault by a 
roommate. Record on Appeal, pp. 729:4-730:4. From that dispute, 
appellant brought a lawsuit for multiple claims of conspiracy 
against the landlord, the other tenant, the house sitter, the 
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landlord's lawyer and the lawyer's firm, styled Reza Semnani v. 
Carolyn Clark, Brian Barkey, Robert Rees and Fabian & Clendenin, 
#950901241PI (the previous lawsuit). The claims against the 
lawyer and law firm were dismissed with prejudice and found to be 
frivolous. Defendant's Exhibit 15; Record on Appeal, pp. 782:19-
784:14 SL 836:24-837:1. Shortly after those claims were 
dismissed, the landlord (Clark) and other tenant (Barkey) settled 
the claims against them for $3,250.00. Record on Appeal pp. 
769:22-770:4. 
Appellant never had a formal, written contract with 
appellee. Although there was no written agreement between them, 
appellant initiated the lawsuit and otherwise represented 
appellee. At various times, including on or about January 18, 
1995, and eleven months later on or about December 15, 1995, 
appellant presented to appellee a proposed, retroactive fee 
agreement (the proposed agreement). Plaintiff's Exhibit 5; 
Defendant's Exhibit 2; Record on Appeal pp. 758:8-22 & 808:19-23. 
The proposed agreement allowed for a 100% contingent fee. 
Appellee never signed the proposed agreement and never agreed to 
any of its terms. Substantial confusion over appellant's 
compensation ensued. Record on Appeal pg. 898:18-23 & 899:11-24. 
Appellee resolved that confusion by giving appellant authority to 
accept the Clark and Barkey offers on condition that appellant 
accept a one-third contingent fee. Record on Appeal, pg. 899:11-
3 
900:8. Appellant assented to that condition and accepted the 
offers on those terms. Id. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, pp. 10 & 11. 
Appellant accepted the $3250.00 from Clark and Barkey but 
refused to tender any portion of it to appellee, claiming to be 
entitled to the entire settlement proceeds. Defendant's Exhibit 
13; Record on Appeal, pg. 770:2-4. Appellant also had accepted 
from Clark a check for the return of appellee's rental deposit 
but refused to give it to appellee. Record on Appeal, pg. 770:5-
21. 
VI. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. 
A. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
The Court of Appeals "presumes the findings of fact of the 
trial court to be correct." Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 
462 (Utah App. 1987) . "Findings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the trial court to judge the credibility of witnesses." U.R.C.P. 
52(a). Here, the trial court painstakingly considered the 
conflicting evidence before making its findings. There is clear 
and ample evidence to support them. 
B. APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF HIS APPEAL. 
To challenge the trial court's fact findings successfully, 
it is the appellant's burden to cite all the evidence in the 
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record in support of the judgment, including all reasonable 
inferences, and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding under attack. Grayson Roper, 
Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989); Harker v. 
Condominiums Forest Glen. Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) . Here, appellant has done just the opposite. 
Appellant merely has presented the evidence favorable to his case 
and in the light least favorable to the trial court's judgment. 
It is neither this Court's nor appellee's burden to search the 
record for evidence which supports the judgment. Appellant has 
failed altogether to carry his burden to marshall the evidence. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT. 
Where there is an enforceable, expressed contract, it will 
be enforced in lieu of the equitable remedy of quantum meruit. 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 
1994). Here, based on its finding of an express, verbal 
agreement between the parties by which appellant would accept a 
one-third contingent fee, the trial court correctly concluded 
that the equitable remedy of quantum meruit did not apply. 
Record on Appeal, pg. 900:19-25. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ALSO MAY BE 
UPHELD ON A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
The Court of Appeals may uphold the trial court's judgment 
on any proper grounds. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 
5 
1995). Here, the trial court's judgment may be upheld even if 
quantum meruit applies to appellant's claims. 
E. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM FOR COSTS. 
The party whose theory of the case is accepted by the trier 
of fact prevails. Here, appellant proposed he should awarded a 
100% contingent fee or a quantum meruit award of $9,999.99. 
Record on Appeal, pg. Appellee proposed appellant should be 
awarded a one-third contingent fee plus costs in the previous 
action. The Court awarded appellant a one-third contingent fee 
plus costs in the previous action. Although the judgment awards 
money to appellant it is in the amount which appellee proposed. 
Appellee prevailed. Appellee could be awarded costs but he 
incurred no recoverable costs and submitted no cost bill. 
The trial court's judgment to charge neither party costs is 
within its discretion and should stand. 
F. APPELLEE APPLIES TO RECOVER THE FEES HE INCURS 
TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, appellee 
applies to the Court to recover the attorney's fees he will spend 
in defense of this appeal. Appellee understands the Rule 33 
remedy only applies in egregious cases and he makes this 
application cautiously and advisedly. See Porco v. Porco, 752 
P.2d 365, (Utah Ct. App. 1988). But the present appeal has no 
reasonable legal or factual basis, has been taken with no 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing, is frivolous, and never 
6 
should have been brought. See Id. ; O'Brien v. Rushf 744 P.2d 
306, 309-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Appellee respectfully requests 
the Court to award him the attorney's fees he will incur to 
defend this frivolous appeal. 
VII. ARGUMENT. 
A. THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL 
COURT'S JUDGMENT. 
The Court of Appeals "presumes the findings of fact of the 
trial court to be correct." Gillmor v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 
462 (Utah App. 1987). On review, the Court "views the evidences 
and all the inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom in 
a light most supportive of the trial court's findings." Id. 
quoting Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 106 (Utah 1984). 
"Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary evidence, 
shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the 
credibility of witnesses." U.R.C.P. 52(a). Here, the trial 
court painstakingly considered the conflicting evidence before 
making its findings. There is clear and ample evidence to 
support them. Two examples suffice. 
First, the trial court found appellee never signed or agreed 
to the proposed fee agreement appellant attempted to enforce by 
this action. Record on Appeal, pg. 898:12-23. In support of 
that finding, the trial court considered evidence that appellant 
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proposed the fee agreement to appellee several different times. 
Appellant's Exhibit 5; Appellee's Exhibit 2; Record on Appeal 
pp. 758:8-22 & 808:19-23. Each time appellant proposed the 
agreement, appellee rejected it. 807:25-809:8. Appellee 
expressed in correspondence that he never agreed to the proposed 
agreement and was not bound by its terms. Defendant's Exhibit 6. 
On January 5, 1996, appellant sent appellee a letter which 
states: 
To the extent you agree to all of the terms of our 
written agreement as provided to you, there will be no 
attorney's fee relating to Robert Rees and Fabian & 
Clendenin other than the attorney's fee associated with 
the settlement received concerning Carolyn Clark and 
the attorney's fees associated with the rejected/ 
pending settlement offer/agreement concerning Brian 
Barkey. 
Defendant's Exhibit 10. Thus, almost a year after appellant 
first presented to appellee the proposed fee agreement he 
acknowledged appellee had not agreed to it. Finally, appellant 
knew appellee had no money to pay appellant an hourly fee but 
represented him anyway, spending 123 hours to achieve the 
$3,250.00 settlement. Plaintiff's Exhibit's 1 & 3. 
Second, the trial court found the parties had a verbal 
agreement by which appellee agreed to accept a one-third 
contingent fee. In support of that finding, there is 
overwhelming evidence that the parties had a verbal agreement 
memorialized by correspondence or an agreement expressed by the 
correspondence itself. Appellee expressly conditioned 
8 
appellant's authority to accept the settlement offers on 
appellant's taking a one-third contingent fee. In a December 12, 
1995, letter to appellant, appellee memorializes the parties' 
prior verbal agreement that appellant take a one-third contingent 
fee and expresses that agreement as a condition to appellant's 
authority to accept both offers. Plaintiff's Exhibit 9. In a 
January 12, 1996, letter to appellant, appellee reiterates that 
condition as to the Barkey settlement. Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, 
pg. 10. In return correspondence, appellant expressed his assent 
to that condition and expresses he has accepted the Barkey offer 
on the basis of appellee's January 12, 1996, letter. Id, pg. 11. 
Appellant argues the chronology of the correspondence 
seeking and giving authority to accept the Clark offer shows that 
appellee expressed the condition after appellant already had 
accepted the offer on appellee's behalf. That argument is belied 
by appellant's acceptance of that condition as to the Barkey 
offer. And there is ample evidence that the correspondence 
merely records a condition which appellee had imposed verbally 
before appellant accepted the Clark offer on appellee's behalf. 
In a December 7, 1995, letter, appelljfe memorializes a 
telephone conversation between the parties and expresses his 
intent to accept the Clark offer the next day. Appellant's 
Exhibit 12. Appellant accepted the Clark offer by a letter dated 
December 8, 1995. Id. pg. 3. On December 12, 1995, appellee 
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faxed a letter to appellant which states he received appellant's 
December 7 letter the day before, on December 11, and states: 
Our verbal agreement was that I will pay you (the 
attorney), thirty-three percent of the proceeds I may 
receive in this lawsuit if you represent me. I have 
already paid you $200.00 for the court costs. 
Based on this agreement (above) only, you may 
accept settlement offers from both Miss Clark and Mr. 
Barkey at the same time (in the amount of three 
thousand dollars). 
Appellee's Exhibit 3 (parentheses in original). 
That exchange amply supports the trial court's finding that 
the parties had a verbal agreement prior to appellant's 
acceptance of the Clark offer which appellee's December 12, 1995, 
letter memorializes. That reasonable minds may draw different 
conclusions from that evidence is not sufficient ground on which 
to upset the trial court's finding. Pollesche v. Transamerican 
Ins. Co.. 497 P.2d 236, 238 (Utah 1972). The trial court's 
findings are not clearly erroneous and its judgment should stand. 
B. APPELLANT FAILED TO MARSHALL THE EVIDENCE 
IN SUPPORT OF HIS APPEAL. 
To challenge the trial court's fact findings successfully, 
it is the appellant's burden to cite all the evidence in the 
record in support of the judgment, including all reasonable 
inferences, and then demonstrate why, even when viewed in the 
light most favorable to the trial court, the evidence is 
insufficient to support the finding under attack. Grayson Roper, 
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Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 1989); Harker v. 
Condominiums Forest Glen, Inc., 740 P.2d 1361, 1362 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1987) . Here, appellant has done just the opposite. 
Appellant merely has presented the evidence favorable to his case 
and in the light least favorable to the trial court's judgment. 
It is neither this Court's nor appellee's burden to search the 
record for evidence which supports the judgment. The following 
few examples reveal appellant failed to marshall and present the 
ample evidence in support of the trial court's judgment. 
Appellant failed to present the evidence that appellee 
specifically conditioned appellant's authority to accept both 
settlement offers on appellant's taking a one-third contingent 
fee. The failure is especially marked as to the Barkey 
settlement, as follows: 
In appellee's January 12, 1996, letter to appellant, 
appellee expresses the condition: 
Our verbal agreement has been that I will pay you 
thirty-three percent of any proceeds I may receive in 
this case. Based on this agreement, you may accept any 
settlement offer from Mr. Barkey. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 11, pg. 10. 
In return correspondence, appellant expressed his assent to 
that condition and expresses he has accepted the Barkey offer on 
the basis of appellee's January 12, 1996, letter: 
I have reviewed your fax of January 12, 1996. I 
will accept $333.33 as my attorney fee with regard to 
the recovery to be received from Mr. Barkey. I have 
li 
forwarded an acceptance of Mr. Barkey's offer to his 
attorney. A copy of that letter is enclosed. 
Id, pg. 11. 
Appellant's letter goes on to impose additional conditions 
on his willingness to accept a one-third contingent fee, but by 
then the deal was done. Id. Appellant already accepted the 
settlement offer on appellee's behalf. He cannot accept the 
condition, bind appellee to the settlement and unilaterally 
impose additional conditions on his agreement with appellee after 
the fact. 
Appellant failed to reveal he presented the proposed 
agreement to appellee several times, including once on or about 
December 15, 1995, after he had represented appellee for almost a 
year, after the claims against the lawyer and law firm were 
dismissed and during the negotiations to settle the remaining 
claims. Record on Appeal, pp. 758:8 to 759:3, Defendant's 
Exhibit 2. Appellant's presenting the proposed fee agreement 
again in December reveals appellee had not agreed to the contract 
previously, as appellant has claimed. Appellant also fails to 
address the trial court's finding that appellant knew appellee 
had no funds to hire a lawyer other than on a contingent fee but 
represented him anyway, spending more than 123 hours to achieve 
the $3,250.00 in settlement. Record on Appeal, pg. 898:24-
899:10; Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 & 3. 
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Appellant represented to this Court that the trial court 
rejected his claim based on the proposed fee agreement because 
appellant was unable to produce a signed contract. Appellant's 
Brief, pg 6. In truth, the trial court's finding was based on 
the evidence as revealed in appellee's brief and on substantial 
other evidence. 
Finally, as to the trial court's failure to award appellant 
his costs in this action, appellant states in his brief: "All of 
the relief awarded was opposed by defendant." That simply is 
false. From start to finish, appellee's theory of the case was 
that appellant should be awarded a one-third contingent fee plus 
costs in the previous lawsuit. Record on Appeal, pg. 728:8-9 
(opening statement), Record on Appeal, pg. . (closing argument). 
The trial court accepted appellee's theory of the case and denied 
appellant's application for costs in this case. 
Those are a few examples of appellant's myriad failures to 
reveal to this Court evidence in support of the trial court's 
judgment. Appellant has failed altogether to carry his burden to 
marshall the evidence. 
C. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THE CLAIM FOR QUANTUM MERUIT. 
Where there is an enforceable, expressed contract, it will 
be enforced in lieu of the equitable remedy of quantum meruit. 
Bailey-Allen Co., Inc. v. Kurzet, 876 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App. 
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1994). Here, based on its finding of an express, verbal 
agreement between the parties by which appellant would accept a 
one-third contingent fee, the trial court correctly concluded 
that the equitable remedy of quantum meruit did not apply. 
Record on Appeal, pg. 900:19-25. 
D. THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT ALSO MAY BE 
UPHELD ON A THEORY OF QUANTUM MERUIT. 
The Court of Appeals may uphold the trial court's judgment 
on any proper grounds. DeBry v. Noble, 889 P.2d 428, 444 (Utah 
1995). Here, the trial court's judgment may be upheld even if 
quantum meruit applies to appellant's claims. 
Quantum meruit has two branches: "(1) contracts implied in 
law, also known as quasi contracts or unjust enrichment, which 
are not actions to enforce a contract but are actually actions to 
require restitution; and (2) contracts implied in fact, which 
are contracts established by conduct. Knight v. Post, 748 P.2d 
1097 (Utah App. 1988). 
1. Contract Implied in Law. 
To prevail under a theory of implied in law contract or 
unjust enrichment, appellant must show three elements: (1) 
appellant conferred a benefit on appellee; (2) appellee was 
aware of the benefit; and (3) appellee "retained the benefit 
under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for him to 
retain the benefit without payment of its value." Knight, 748 
14 
P.2d at 1100. Thus, payment to appellant must relate in value to 
the benefit conferred. In specific, where the claim is for 
services, one must prove that the amount of labor used and charge 
for that labor are reasonable. Midwest Fabrication v. Woodex, 
Inc.. 596 P.2d 581, 583 (Or. App. 1979)(claim for labor and 
materials). 
Here, in fact, appellee has received no benefit because 
appellant refused to tender to him any of the small amounts 
recovered, including appellee's rental deposit which the landlord 
tendered to appellant instead of appellee. Defendant's Exhibit 
13; Record on Appeal, pg. 770:2-21.. But in theory, appellee has 
received $3,250.00 as the proceeds of the lawsuit. Appellant 
claims to have spent over 123 hours to have obtained that 
$3,250.00 benefit and desires to be paid $10,000.00 for having 
conferred it. Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 & 3. To obtain that 
$3,250.00, appellant sued the landlord, the other tenant, the 
house sitter, the Robert Reese, the landlord's lawyer and Fabian 
8c Clendenin, the lawyer's firm. The claims against the lawyer 
and law firm were dismissed with prejudice and found to be 
frivolous. Defendant's Exhibit 15; Record on Appeal, pp. 7 82:19-
784:14 & 836:24-837:1. According to the express authority 
appellee gave appellant to accept those offers, appellant 
suggests that one-third of the $3,250.00 is a reasonable amount 
to pay appellant for the benefit he conferred on appellee. 
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2. Contract Implied in Fact. 
To prevail under a theory of implied in fact contract, 
plaintiff must show three elements: (1) defendant requested 
plaintiff to perform the work; (2) defendant expected plaintiff 
to compensate him; and (3) defendant knew or should have known 
plaintiff expected compensation. Knight, 748 P.2d at 1100. 
Once again, however, the amount of that compensation is the 
service's reasonable value. Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 269 
(Utah App. 1987) . "Technically, recovery in contract implied in 
fact is the amount the parties intended as the contract price. 
If that amount is unexpressed, courts will infer that the parties 
intended the amount to be the reasonable market value of the 
appellant's services." Davies v. Olsen, 746 P.2d 264, 269 (Utah 
App. 1987) . Here, the evidence at trial revealed the parties 
expressly intended the contract price to be one-third of the 
settlement proceeds. Record on Appeal, pp. 899:25-900:8. But 
failing that evidence, the reasonable market value of appellant's 
services is the professional standard of one-third contingent on 
recovery. 
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E. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING 
APPELLANTS CLAIM FOR COSTS. 
The party whose theory of the case is accepted by the trier 
of fact prevails. "A prevailing party is one who prevails on a 
significant issue in the litigation and achieves some of the 
benefits sought therein." Frost v. Schroder & Co., Inc., 876 
P.2d 126, 129 (Colo. App. 1994) citing Odenbaugh v. County of 
Weld, 809 P.2d 1059 (Colo. App. 1990). "In identifying a 
prevailing party for purposes of entitlement to an award of costs 
pursuant to [the applicable statute], the focus should be upon 
the countervailing claims and defenses asserted by the litigants, 
rather than upon incidental independent factors that may affect 
the ultimate monetary judgment." Frost, 876 P.2d at 129. 
Here, appellant proposed he should awarded a 100% contingent 
fee or a quantum meruit award of $9,999.99. Record on Appeal, 
pg. Appellee proposed appellant should be awarded a one-third 
contingent fee plus costs in the previous action. The Court 
awarded appellant a one-third contingent fee plus costs in the 
previous action. Although the judgment awards money to appellant 
it is in the amount which appellee proposed. Appellee prevailed. 
Appellee could be awarded costs but he incurred no recoverable 
costs and submitted no cost bill. 
Rule 54(d)(1) states in relevant part: "... costs shall be 
awarded as of course to the prevailing party unless the court 
otherwise directs..." Although cost awards are matters of 
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course, they are not mandatory as appellant argues. The trial 
court "can exercise reasonable discretion in regard to the 
allowance of costs..." Hatanaka v. Struhs, 738 P.2d 1052, 1055 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771, 773-74 
(Utah 1980). The trial court's judgment to charge neither party 
costs is within its discretion and should stand. 
F. APPELLEE APPLIES TO RECOVER THE FEES HE INCURS 
TO DEFEND AGAINST THIS FRIVOLOUS APPEAL. 
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 33, appellee 
applies to the Court to recover the attorney's fees he will spend 
in defense of this appeal. Appellee understands the Rule 33 
remedy only applies in egregious cases and he makes this 
application cautiously and advisedly. See Porco v. Porco, 752 
P.2d 365, (Utah Ct. App. 1988). But the present appeal has no 
reasonable legal or factual basis, has been taken with no 
reasonable likelihood of prevailing, is frivolous, and never 
should have been brought. See Id.; O'Brien v. Rush, 744 P.2d 
306, 309-11 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
Appellant made no attempt to meet his burden to marshall the 
evidence. Likely, that is because if appellant had marshalled 
the evidence he could not make even a colorable argument the 
judgment should be set aside. Instead, he presented only the 
evidence favorable to his position in the light most favorable to 
the result he desires, not in the light most favorable to the 
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trial court's judgment. In doing so, appellant misrepresented to 
this Court the evidence before the trial court. Appellee 
respectfully requests the Court to award him the attorney's fees 
he will incur to defend this frivolous appeal. 
VIII. CONCLUSION. 
There is ample evidence to support the trial court's 
carefully made findings. They are not clearly erroneous. 
Appellant made no attempt to marshall the evidence which would 
have supported that conclusion. 
The trial court accepted appellee's theory of the case and 
awarded appellant the amount appellee proposed. Appellee 
prevailed and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying appellant's application for costs. 
Appellee respectfully requests the Court to deny this appeal 
and affirm the trial court's judgment. Finally, appellee 
requests the Court to award him the attorney's fees he will incur 
to defend this frivolous appeal. 
Respectfully submitted on Novjember 21, 1997. 
Richard G. Hackwell x 
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